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Abstract 
 
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the 
concerns of the electorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in discipline but 
unlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this proposition empirically 
using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 
2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism: 
senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over 
their equally capable non-elite counterparts. We find no evidence of such ill-
discipline; most of the unconditional difference in promotion prospects between the 
two groups can simply be explained by differences in promotion-relevant 
characteristics. However, exploiting an unexpected proposal to remove control over 
promotions from the judiciary, we do find evidence of pandering. When faced by the 
prospect of losing autonomy, senior judges began to favour non-elite candidates, as 
well as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee. 
Our finding that tenured public officials can display both the upsides and downsides 
of electoral accountability has implications for the literature on political agency, as 
well as recent constitutional reforms. 
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1 Introduction
The wisdom of subjecting public officials to democratic accountability continues to stimulate
debate. The first generation of agency-theoretic models (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) highlighted
that elections could ‘discipline’ bad types. More recently, it has been argued that electoral
incentives could result in ‘pandering’ −excessive catering to public opinion− by good types
(Canes-Wrones et al 2001). This tension, coupled with evidence on the association between
political constitutions and economic performance (Persson and Tabellini 2003), has renewed
interest in the normative study of decision-making powers, i.e. who should get to decide what?
The typical approach within this field is to conflate unaccountability with tenure. Maskin
and Tirole (2004), for instance, contrast an official who will stand for re-election−a “politician”−
with a tenured official who, as a result of his job security, pays no heed to beliefs held by voters
−a “judge”− (see also Eggertsson and Le Borgne 2006 and Schultz 2008). While useful as
a modelling shortcut, caution is needed in drawing prescriptions for policy, especially those
based on an assumption that tenured officials attach no weight to voters’ preferences. Given
the inalienable power of the Executive, decisions can be removed from tenured public officials
even if employment cannot. If, as intuition suggests, public officials are keen to retain their
decision-making power, then they may be accountable after all. Consequently, tenured officials
may be more attractive than previously thought if such accountability is a disciplining force,
but less attractive if it creates distortions similar to those alluded to for politicians.
It is one thing to urge for more a circumspect approach to modelling tenured officials
on the basis of intuition, but quite another to document the presence of discipline and/or
pandering in actual behaviour. As with predictions from political agency models, empirical
evidence in this area is sorely lacking (Besley 2006). The objective of this paper is to make
such a contribution. Using a unique new data set, we study the behaviour of “judges” and find
evidence consistent with both the upsides and downsides of accountability.
Purposely, we focus on a scenario where in principle it would seem unlikely to find
evidence of discipline and even more of pandering, namely the senior English judiciary. Senior
judges are the preeminent example of public officials with lifetime tenure, which is clearly a
minimum requirement for our purposes. We focus on the English case for two reasons.1 First,
in England, judicial resignations are extremely rare.2 Since senior judges are already at the top
of the hierarchy, career concerns are unlikely to be an important force.3 Second, the English
judiciary is highly unrepresentative of the population it serves and commonly criticised for
being elitist. For instance, a recent study by an educational pressure group lamented the fact
1We use English to refer to England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems.
2The resignation of a High Court judge in June 2005 was the first in 35 years and “risked the disapproval
of the legal establishment by breaking the unwritten convention that the bench is a life sentence ended only by
retirement or death”, The Guardian, June 23 2005.
3This observation distinguishes our “judges” from the “bureaucrats” studied by Alesina and Tabellini (2007).
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that over 50% of senior English judges had attended boarding schools (the most prestigious
private schools) compared to just 1% of the general population (Sutton Trust 2005). Such a
skewed social background makes it highly likely that judicial policy preferences will differ to
those of the average citizen. This should translate, given the lack of discipline usually associated
with tenured officials, into decisions divergent from those preferred by the median voter.
In addition to hearing cases, an important function performed by senior English judges
has been to select future colleagues.4 These appointment decisions −specifically, the decisions
by promotion committees formed to fill vacancies in the Court of Appeal between 1985 and
2005− are the basis of our study. Again, this focus is easy to motivate. An obvious benefit is
that it is easy to define a given promotion committee’s action space: picking a candidate from
the 100 or so judges serving in the High Court for the (exogenously determined) vacancy in the
Court of Appeal. More importantly, the public perception was one of elitism; an observation
that was widely cited by the Labour Government when stating the case for recent reforms.
Assuming that official selection criteria reflect the preferences of the average citizen, it is there-
fore straightforward to define the equilibria highlighted by the theoretical literature. Selection
of the candidate that most closely meets the official criteria can be interpreted as either a con-
gruent or disciplined decision. A lack of discipline would instead correspond to favouring elite
candidates or, to use the words of a former law lord, selecting “chaps like ourselves”. Finally,
we can interpret favoritism towards non-elite candidates as pandering to the electorate.
Having described the relevant legal institutions and explained how candidates are ex-
pected to meet the official criteria, in Section 3 we ask whether there is any evidence that
senior judges did favour elite candidates. We start by presenting the raw data: the promotion
prospects of the 275 judges serving in the High Court between 1985 and 2005. Consistent with
the popular stereotype, elite judges were substantially more likely to be promoted, even after
adjusting for censoring.
We explore whether this was due to favoritism in a number of different ways. First,
using a discrete choice model of promotion committee decision making, we ask whether the
elite differential: (i) is unresponsive to controlling for officially relevant candidate endowments;
(ii) falls when controlling for endowments argued to be the micro-foundation for favoritism by
political and legal commentators (personal ties to members of the promotion committee such
as attending the same school or practising from the same chambers); and/or (iii) is lower for
‘high stakes’ vacancies generated by promotions to the House of Lords. Then, using a model of
intellectual influence based on Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004), we ask (iv) whether promoted
non-elite judges outperformed promoted elite judges once in the Court of Appeal. Under the
4While senior judges play no role in selecting judges in the US, this is a task performed by judges in many
jurisdictions. Thomas (1997) documents that judges sit on appointments committees in most Western European
countries. A substantial proportion of these appointing judges are nominated by the judiciary itself, e.g. of the
33 members of Consiglio superiore della magistratura (the institution responsible for judicial appointments in
Italy), 20 are directly chosen by the judiciary.
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favoritism interpretation, the answers to these questions should be positive. With our answers
consistently negative, we argue that favoritism of elites seems unlikely. Instead, the evidence
from tests (i) and (iv) suggests that the raw differential is due to the fact that elite candidates
were better endowed with promotion-relevant characteristics.
On this basis one might tentatively conclude that the average promotion committee was
either congruent or disciplined by some form of accountability. This is somewhat premature,
however. An interesting finding that emerges in test (ii) is that, controlling for promotion-
relevant characteristics, personal ties to members of the promotion committee were associated
with a lower chance of promotion. Clearly, this is reminiscent of pandering. We proceed to
examine this hypothesis by identifying a time period in which the source of accountability
discussed −the threat to remove decision-making power− dramatically increased.
The period we use is 2003-2005. In June 2003, the British Prime Minister took the
legal world by surprise by announcing that responsibility for judicial appointments was to
be transferred to a new commission that would act in conjunction with an elected cabinet
minister. This announcement raised the possibility that senior judges would lose de facto
control of promotions to lay commissioners and politicians. Critically for our purposes, the
details of the reform −including the amount of power that judges would hold in the future−
were not settled until March 2005. Between these dates, the senior judiciary openly lobbied
the Government for more power under the new system, while still promoting judges under the
old one. Clearly, these decisions (18% of our sample) were made under the threat of reform,
with obvious returns to minimising perceptions of favoritism.
In Section 4 we disaggregate our results either side of this unexpected shock to the system.
Our findings are consistent with the view that there was an increase in accountability and that
this produced pandering behaviour. In the period before June 2003 the raw elite differential
and the raw connected differential (at least one personal tie to the committee) were positive.
In the period after June 2003 both decreased, with the raw connected differential actually
becoming negative. Using our discrete choice model to control for committee and candidate
characteristics strengthens our findings. The partial effect of elite status was significantly
smaller (in fact negative), and the (weakly negative) association between personal ties and
promotion prospects significantly stronger, after the announcement.
Our findings suggest that insulation from the electorate is never perfect. Tenured un-
elected officials can display behaviour, such as discipline and pandering, typically associated
with political agents. This observation has implications for theory and policy. On the theoret-
ical front, it casts doubt on the wisdom of equating tenure with unaccountability. Instead it
may be more fruitful to regard tenured officials as separated from the electorate by a middle
layer of elected officials that both shields them and threatens to remove their powers. The
latter source of accountability does, however, provide empirical support for the emerging the-
oretical consensus that government employees are motivated by policy outcomes. In fact, we
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highlight a new, and as yet unmodelled, dynamic trade off: tenured public officials appear to
value autonomy and may take distortionary steps to protect it.
Turning to policy, our findings suggest that dissatisfaction with the observed behaviour
of public officials should not necessarily be taken as evidence of lack of accountability and hence
a need for reform. For instance, with the decisions taken by senior English judges prior to 2005
apparently driven by ‘pre-market’ factors rather than ill-disciplined elitism, recent constitu-
tional reforms seem unlikely to ease public concerns. Indeed, as we argue in the Conclusion,
this observation already appears to have been bourne out, with widespread disappointment
following the introduction of the new judicial appointments commission in England and Wales.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Legal Institutions
Figure 1 illustrates the three courts relevant to our study. The Crown Court is primarily a
criminal court, and cases are heard by Circuit judges. The High Court has three divisions.
The Queen’s Bench handles a mixture of civil and criminal cases and judicial reviews. The two
other divisions handle cases in family and chancery matters. High Court judges are assigned
to a division upon appointment, typically reflecting their prior legal specialism (e.g. public
law specialists to the Queen’s Bench, tax specialists to the Chancery Division). Most cases are
heard by a single judge. The Court of Appeal has two divisions and judges are not assigned to
a particular division upon appointment. The Criminal Division handles criminal appeals from
the Crown Court, and the Civil Division civil appeals. Most cases are heard by three judges. It
is common for High Court judges to sit in the Criminal Division but not in the Civil Division.
During our sample period, the vast majority of High Court appointments were from
the Bar rather than the Circuit bench. In contrast, all Court of Appeal appointments were
promotions from the High Court. For our analysis, it is important to identify three features of
this promotions process: how vacancies arise, the composition of the selection committee, and
the official criteria for promotion.
The first issue is clear cut. A vacancy arises only if a Court of Appeal judge exits or
Parliament creates a new post. During our sample period, there were 85 vacancies. Of these,
69 arose due to exits (38 retirements, 1 death and 30 promotions to the House of Lords), while
16 were new posts.
Formal responsibility for these promotion decisions lay with the Lord Chancellor (and
ultimately with the Queen of England), a cabinet minister rather than a serving judge. In
practice, however, the system was closer to self-governance, with ‘judges choosing judges’.
When a vacancy arose the Lord Chancellor reviewed candidates at a meeting with the Heads
of Division and a few other senior judges (Peach Report, 1999). Comments by the Judges’
Council (the judiciary’s representative body) suggest that serving judges played a crucial role
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at these meetings:
“the judiciary as a whole, and the Heads of Division in particular, are deeply involved in
the process. The Lord Chancellor’s decisions have, in practice, drawn heavily on the advice
that the judiciary has been able to give. Indeed, in respect of senior judicial appointments
made or recommended by the last two Lord Chancellors, it is believed that no appointment
has been made to which the Heads of Division raised objection”, Judges’ Council (2003,
paragraph 71).
In light of this evidence, we take the composition of a promotion committee formed to fill
a given vacancy to be the incumbent Heads of Division and Lord Chancellor. The decision
problem faced by such a committee was to select one of the serving High Court judges for
promotion.
Throughout our sample period the choices made by these committees were subject to
intense criticism, with claims that judges with an elite background were being given undue
preference. To explore allegations of favoritism we must obviously identify the criteria upon
which promotion decisions should be based. The official guiding principle has always been
‘merit’ (DCA 2005). The Judges’ Council usefully elucidates how this principle has been
applied in practice:
“There is the general quality of the candidate, as a judge of demonstrated outstanding
ability, and there is the requirement that the candidate should also have expert knowledge
of the specialist area of the law which will be required to meet the needs of the Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal judges are also potential candidates for membership of the
House of Lords (...) The scope for further promotion must also be taken into consideration
when determining at what stage of their judicial career particular candidates should be
promoted.” Judges’ Council (2003, paragraphs 98-99).
Further clarification follows:
‘The best testimony as to whether judges have the necessary qualities for promotion to
the Court of Appeal is their track record since being appointed as judges. This, to a judicial
colleague, will be demonstrated by the quality of their judgements. Those judgements will
have been carefully studied on appeals by a candidate’s senior colleagues.’ Judges’ Council
(2003, paragraph 99).
We interpret the above as saying that age, experience, the match between a candidate’s legal
specialism and the needs of the Court of Appeal, and ability as evidenced by good judgements
are the key promotion criteria. Our data collection exercise is tailored accordingly. Using
the case law provider Westlaw, we follow each published case heard by the 275 High Court
judges serving during our sample period (a total of over 28,000 cases) and then record the legal
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subject and all subsequent appeals and citations. Then, at the date of each promotion decision,
we construct measures of quality (reversals and affirmations by members of the promotion
committee), legal specialism (High Court division and legal subject of past cases), age and
experience. To capture the ‘needs of the Court of Appeal’, we also record the High Court
division and destination (retirement or promotion) of the exiting Court of Appeal judge, if any.
2.2 Elite Status
The characteristic most commonly associated with membership of the English elite is atten-
dance at a prestigious private school. Consistent with this interpretation, when pointing to
elitism, politicians and interest groups have typically highlighted the narrow educational back-
ground of serving judges.5
If lay commentators tend to emphasise where judges were educated, then legal experts
tend to focus on where judges worked prior to appointment. The typical employment history
of a High Court judge is several decades private practice as a barrister and a short-period
serving as a part-time judge. This is true for 236 (86%) of the judges in our sample, with
just 38 promotions from the Circuit bench and one appointment from private practice as a
solicitor. Such uniformity in the type of employment history masks important differences
however. Indeed it is where, not whether, an individual practices as a barrister that is often
thought to be the key to future success. Malleson (2000), for instance, reports a senior judge
describing the relationship between membership of a top-ranking chambers and judicial office
as a “golden road”.
We incorporate both educational and occupational factors when defining our elite status
variable. First, we assign the 74 judges appointed to the High Court bench directly from a
top-ranking chambers to the elite group, and the 38 judges promoted from the Circuit bench
to the non-elite group. We define a set of chambers to be top-ranking if it is included in The
Lawyer Top 30 ranking (see Table A1). As one might expect given the “traditional nature of
the Bar” (Malleson 2000), these two groups differ markedly in terms of educational background.
Both the proportion of privately educated and the proportion of Oxbridge educated judges are
significantly higher in the group appointed from a top-ranking chambers relative to the group
promoted from the Circuit bench. Of the remaining 163 judges, 42 attended a state-run school.
To allow for a direct effect of education (beyond access to top-ranking chambers), we assign
these judges to the non-elite group. This gives us a total of 195 elite judges and 80 non-elite
judges.
5We noted the remarks of an educational pressure group in the Introduction (Sutton Trust 2005). This, and
a subsequent report on the background of journalists, prompted The Independent to run a frontpage article
under the headline “Stranglehold” on July 15 2006. See also the evidence given to the House of Commons Home
Affairs Select Committee by a Labour MP in 1996: “we are concerned that an astonishing 80% of the senior
judiciary were privately educated”.
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Before comparing promotion prospects across these groups, we briefly pause to ask why
elite judges might be favored. In this respect, the leading explanation for the existence of
favoritism is that the (overwhelmingly elite) committee members might have a tendency to
look for candidates who share their narrowly-defined background.6 In fact, a former law lord
actually admitted on TV in 1992 that judges tend to look for “chaps like ourselves”. Following
the legal literature, we will refer to this possibility as ‘self-cloning’. With this micro-foundation
for favoritism in mind, we also construct a connectivity status variable to measure whether a
judge has the same narrowly-defined background as any members of the promotion committee.
To illustrate, a candidate for a particular vacancy will be deemed elite if he practised from a
top-ranking chambers but he will only be connected (at least along this dimension) if a member
of the promotion committee also practised from the same physical location.
3 Did Senior Judges Favour Elites?
3.1 Unconditional Evidence
Consistent with the public perception of elitism, Figure 1 shows that elite judges overwhelm-
ingly dominated the senior judiciary in late 2005. The Figure also shows that the percentage
of elite judges is higher as one moves up the hierarchy, suggesting that the prevalence of elites
is not just a consequence of the narrowness of the pool from which High Court judges are
selected. Instead, elites seem more likely to be chosen at each stage of the judicial career.
The main drawback of Figure 1 is that it only portrays judges serving on the last day of our
sample period. In Panel A of Table 1 we study all 275 High Court judges serving between June
1985 and December 2005. Around 30% of these judges were promoted to the Court of Appeal,
whereas 26% retired without being promoted. Among elite judges these percentages are 40%
and 21% respectively. Strikingly, only 11% of non-elite judges were promoted, whereas 40%
retired while still serving in the High Court. The last column in Panel A of Table 1 confirms
that the differences across groups are statistically significant.
One weakness of Panel A is that it does not adjust for censoring. This is important
because close to 40% of our sample of High Court judges were still practising at the end of
2005. Differential censoring among elite and non-elite judges − for instance due to non-elite
judges joining the High Court later in time − could in principle be responsible for these findings.
To account for this, we take an inflow sample of 240 judges appointed between 1980 and 2005
(a subset of the stock sample of 275) and compute Kaplan-Meier survivor functions overall
6The importance of personal ties figured prominently in the political and scholarly debate. For instance,
Drewry (1998) points to the ‘old-boy-network’ that forms the basis of the appointment process. Similarly,
continuing his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee (see the previous footnote) the Labour MP
comments: “It appears to be self-perpetuating does it not? They all know each other, many of them went to
school together, most of them went to university together and they have no doubt known each other all the time
dining in their various Inns of Court (...) they appear to move in very limited circles.”
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and separately for elite and non-elite judges. The first column of Panel B reveals that the
(censoring-adjusted) likelihood that a judge will be promoted within 14 years is 56%. The
next columns show that this likelihood is much higher for elite judges (65%) than for non-elite
judges (24%). A Log Rank test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the survivor functions are
equal for elite and non-elite judges.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The unconditional evidence certainly supports the popular stereotype: elite judges were more
likely to be promoted. The question is whether this differential arose because promotion com-
mittees were actually favouring elite judges or because elite judges were better endowed with
promotion-relevant characteristics.7 We attempt to shed light on this issue in a number of
different ways.
First, using a simple empirical model of promotion committee behaviour, we explore
whether the elite differential is robust to controlling for the four promotion criteria discussed
in Section 2. In doing so, we also control for connectivity status. Suppose, as we have argued,
that the most plausible micro-foundation for favoritism (if it exists) is ‘self-cloning’. Then,
under the favoritism interpretation, controlling for connectivity should reduce the size of the
elite differential. Next, using the same empirical model, we examine situations where the
committee faces a greater need to promote a candidate of high ability. If the elite differential
is truly the result of favoritism, we should expect the promotion committee to indulge in it
less when the Court of Appeal is relatively starved of talent, say due to the loss of a high
ability judge to the House of Lords, than in the normal course of affairs. In sum, we should see
a lower elite differential for ‘high stakes’ vacancies generated by promotions relative to those
generated by retirements or new posts. Finally, we examine the behaviour of the promoted
judges themselves. Under the favoritism interpretation, a non-elite candidate must have some
other compensating characteristic, such as ability, to be selected over an elite candidate. As
such, we should expect the average promoted non-elite judge to be more able than the average
promoted elite judge (cf. Lazear and Rosen 1990). This observation motivates our final test: a
comparison of the performance of elite and non-elite judges after joining the Court of Appeal.
3.3 Discrete Choice Results
In choosing an empirical model we balance a desire to capture institutional details − in par-
ticular the relative performance evaluation implicit in a committee selecting a candidate from
the current stock of High Court judges − with constraints imposed by the small sample size.
Our specification, McFadden’s choice model, has some attractive features (e.g. the freedom to
7In posing this question we have not ruled out the possibility that promotion committees were favouring non-
elite candidates. If elite candidates were better endowed with promotion relevant characteristics, then pandering
behaviour could still produce a raw elite differential.
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estimate on a subset of alternatives) but does impose some strong assumptions. We discuss
this modelling choice in Section 3.5, after we have presented our results.
Empirical Model Consider a promotion committee n that forms to fill a vacancy arising in
the Court of Appeal. The set of alternatives facing this committee is the current stock of High
Court judges. Letting Unj denote the utility this committee derives from choosing alternative
j, its choice problem is to maximise Unj = Vnj +εnj ,where Vnj is known by the researcher up to
some parameters and εnj is known to the committee but treated by the researcher as random.
Given this choice problem, the probability that promotion committee n chooses alternative i
is
Pni = Pr
[
εnj − εni < Vni − Vnj , ∀j 6= i
]
. (1)
We proceed on the assumption that we can specify Vnj sufficiently well such that the unobserved
portion of utility for one alternative provides no information about the unobserved portion of
utility for another alternative (i.e. the εnj are independent over j). Given a further assumption
that these unobserved portions of utility are iid extreme value, (1) can be re-written as the
standard Logit choice probability (McFadden 1974)
Pni =
exp(Vni)∑
j exp(Vnj)
. (2)
As is standard, we adopt the linear in parameters form Vnj = β′xnj + cj , where xnj is a vector
of observables that vary over both alternatives and committees and cj is an alternative-specific
constant which ensures that εnj has zero mean. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the
variables included in xnj . The probability of committee n choosing the alternative that we
observe it choose is
i(Pni)yni , (3)
where yni = 1 if committee n chose i and zero otherwise. Assuming that promotion committees
act independently,8 the log of the probability of observing our choice data is
LogL(β, γ, c) =
N∑
n=1
∑
i
yni lnPni, (4)
where c is a vector of alternative-specific constants.
Maximisation of (4) to obtain parameter estimates would be straightforward were it not
for the fact that promotion committees face a large number of alternatives. Given statutory
increases in the size of the High Court, the number of alternatives also varies over committees;
e.g. a committee meeting in 1985 faces 76 alternatives, while a committee meeting in 2005
faces 108 alternatives. To conserve degrees of freedom, we estimate the model on a subset of
8Ruling out preferences for conformity or non-conformity, this really only requires that past committee choices
do not place meaningful constraints on current choices - i.e. that there are enough similar alternatives.
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alternatives. Specifically, we take 5 random draws without replacement from the set of unchosen
alternatives at the date of each vacancy and then add these to the 85 chosen alternatives to
give a total sample size of 510.9 Since all alternatives have the same chance of being selected
into the subset, (4) is still the appropriate log likelihood function for our selected data (see
Train 2003, p. 68-70).
Results The first column of Table 3 confirms our earlier finding that having an elite back-
ground is associated with a higher likelihood of promotion. The exponential of the coefficient
gives an indication of magnitude. In this unconditional baseline specification, elite status is
associated with a 3.8-fold increase in the odds of an alternative being chosen for promotion by
a given promotion committee.
In the second column we include controls for the promotion criteria discussed in Section
2. Both age at entry and experience in the High Court are included in quadratic form. ‘Ability
as evidenced by sound judgements’ is proxied by the percentage of a candidate’s prior cases
that have been reversed (affirmed) by a member of the promotion committee. We attempt
to capture the match between legal specialism and the needs of the Court of Appeal in two
different ways. First, we ascertain whether an alternative and the departing Court of Appeal
judge (if there is one) share the same High Court division. To illustrate, consider a committee
charged with filling a vacancy created by the departure of a Court of the Appeal judge who
served in the Chancery division while in the High Court. By this definition, we would expect
roughly 15% of this committee’s alternatives to match on legal specialism. Second, to reflect
heterogeneity in work undertaken by judges appointed to the Queen’s Bench Division, we divide
each alternative’s prior cases into seven court/legal subject categories and include the number
of cases in six of these categories together with the total number of cases.10
Including these promotion-relevant characteristics more than halves the estimated elite
coefficient (from 3.84 to 2.42, noting than the baseline change in odds is one). This is remark-
able, especially since our measures of the promotion criteria are undoubtedly imperfect. Such
a decrease in the coefficient certainly casts doubt on the hypothesis that the remaining elite
differential is due to favoritism.
The reasons for the marked decline in the elite differential are apparent in Table 2. Elite
judges are on average two years younger when they enter the High Court. This is an advantage
because of the committee’s need to consider “the scope for further promotion”. Elite judges
are also more likely to hear cases in, and hence have “expert knowledge of”, public and civil
law. Given the dramatic rise in judicial reviews and the fact that High Court judges assist with
9We exclude non-meaningful alternatives with less than 2 years experience or who exit on the same day.
10While we interpret the number of cases in each category as legal specialism, an alternative interpretation
might emphasise non-random case allocation. Auxilliary regressions (available upon request) show that this
interpretation is unlikely as our court-subject measures are highly correlated with measures that pre-date ap-
pointment, such as the specialism of the judge’s chambers or the judge’s self-reported specialism as a barrister.
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criminal but not civil cases in the Court of Appeal, these are precisely the areas of expertise
most in need in the Court of Appeal.
In the third column of Table 3 we investigate whether sharing the same narrowly de-
fined background with members of the promotion committee increases a candidate’s chances
of promotion (the leading micro-foundation for the favoritism hypothesis). We consider four
dimensions: whether the candidate (i) attended the same school, (ii) attended the same univer-
sity (college if Oxford or Cambridge), (iii) practised from the same chambers or (iv) belonged
to the same (sporting or gentleman’s) club as any member of the promotion committee. Our
connectivity measure to the Lord Chancellor (Heads of Division respectively) is the percentage
of these dimensions that the candidate is connected to the Lord Chancellor (average Head of
Division). Note from Table 2 that, unsurprisingly, elite candidates are much more connected
than non-elite judges.
The results in Table 3 show that, contrary to what one would expect under the favoritism
hypothesis, judges with strong personal ties to the Heads of Division are less likely to be
promoted. The coefficient is economically as well as statistically significant: an increase in
connectivity to the Heads of Division of one standard deviation leads to a decrease in the odds
of being selected from one to .73 = exp(−6.072 ∗ .05). On the other hand, being connected to
the Lord Chancellor does not seem to decrease (or increase) a candidate chances of promotion.
Lastly, we find no evidence that the elite differential is lower for ‘high stakes’ vacancies
generated by further promotions from the Court of Appeal. It therefore does not seem as if
non-elite judges are more in demand when the Court of Appeal is relatively starved of talent.11
3.4 Post Promotion Results
Measuring Performance We compare the performance of judges after joining the Court of
Appeal in terms of positive voluntary citations by other judges in unrelated cases. We choose
this measure because, in principle, positive citation counts should reflect ability in the most
important dimension of a Court of Appeal judge’s work, namely clarification and expansion of
the law and its legal principles.12 Before discussing econometric concerns, we first explain the
concept of a positive voluntary citation.
The citations in our database come pre-coded by lawyers at Westlaw. Almost all are
positive and fall into one of three categories: ‘applied’, ‘followed’ and ‘considered’. The label
‘applied’ is assigned when the principles of law in the annotated case have been applied to a
new set of facts and circumstances; that is, when the citing judge did not have to (since the
facts and circumstances of his case were different), but nevertheless chose to, use the principles
11This is true even when we control for the elite status of the departing judge to account for potential favoritism
in the promotion from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords.
12The legal literature also favors citation counts over other measures of senior judicial performance. See Choi
and Gulati (2004), Posner (2005) and the Florida State University Review Special Issue in 2005.
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of law developed in the cited case. Arguably, legal principles of the cited case were ‘applied’
because they were more sound, useful, persuasive and original than those in other cases. The
label ‘followed’ is assigned when the citing judge is bound by the rule of precedent. Since a
judge who is obliged to apply the legal principles of an earlier case is not necessarily endorsing
them, we do not use ‘followed’ citations as evidence of good performance. Finally, the label
‘considered’ is assigned when the court in the annotating case has discussed the decision in the
annotated case but has not actually followed it; that is, a reference has been made to the cited
case, but its legal principles have not been explicitly endorsed. Since we cannot be certain
that the citation reflects good and original legal thinking by the cited judge, we also drop
‘considered’ citations from our measure. The dependent variables described below are solely
based on counts of ‘applied’ citations.
Econometric Concerns Clearly, if we studied the performance of judges throughout their
time in the Court of Appeal, our results would be affected by ability-related attrition. That is,
since the best performers leave for the House of Lords, we would end up comparing the perfor-
mance of the losers of the following promotion tournament. Since the most rapid promotion in
our sample occurred after 585 days, we compare the performance of judges during their first
585 days in the Court of Appeal.
A further concern is that citations could be driven by strategic behaviour rather than
ability. One possibility is that citation prone cases could be allocated to judges with a particular
profile. Our conversations with the government agency responsible for the administration of
the courts suggest that the allocation of cases in the Court of Appeal is in fact exogenous to
judicial background characteristics. The key factor is whether a judge is available when the
listing officer is notified of the case. Further evidence that the allocation of cases is (statistically
speaking) identical across groups is provided in Table A3 where we show that a rich measure
of the legal subject of a case (with around 90 categories) is uncorrelated with the background
of the judges sitting in that case.
Turning to strategic citation behaviour itself, the leading possibility is that citations are
more likely to occur within background groups than across them. For instance, elite judges
may be more likely to cite other elite judges due to social preferences or better knowledge
of their cases. If this is true, then judges belonging to the larger group (in this example the
elite group) could receive a higher number of citations, independent of their true ability. To
allow for this possibility, we disaggregate our dependent variables by the elite status of the
citing judge. A less plausible possibility is that a judge might cite a newly promoted Court of
Appeal judge because he anticipates that this judge could (many years in the future) become
a Head of Division and will remember the favour. Since members of the House of Lords no
longer face career concerns, we would ideally disaggregate our dependent variable by the court
of the citing judge. Unfortunately, the number of citations by law lords is sufficiently small
to preclude such analysis. We do, however, use an index of intellectual influence (Palacios-
13
Huerta and Volji 2004) as one of our dependent variables. As we discuss below, this measure
over-weights citations by cases in the House of Lords and therefore partially addresses such
concerns.
Empirical Models and Results Our first specification, reported in the first column of
Table 4, is a Poisson regression. In Panel A this regression is run at judge-level. Specifically,
we relate the number of citations that a judge (one of the 85 chosen by the committees modelled
in Section 3.2) received across all of the cases in which he was presiding and in his first 585
days in the Court of Appeal to his background characteristics. We include a dummy for elite
status to explore whether non-elite judges perform better than elite judges, as one would expect
under the favoritism interpretation of the raw elite differential. In fact, we find the opposite:
the elite coefficient is positive. In view of the possible association between connectivity and
promotion, we also include a dummy that takes the value 1 if the judge was connected to any
member of the committee that promoted him, referring to this as ‘connectivity-at-promotion’
status. If elites were favored and connectivity was the microfoundation, then one would expect
the group that was unconnected-at-promotion to perform better post-promotion. Again, we
find no such evidence. Consistent with the negative impact of connectivity reported in Section
3.3, the connected-at-promotion coefficient is positive (albeit insignificant).13
In Panel B we disaggregate to case-level, relating the number of positive citations that a
Court of Appeal case (one of the 8928 in our data) received to the background of the presiding
judge. To control for attrition, we introduce a variable ‘Presiding Judge Just Arrived’ to indi-
cate whether the presiding judge was appointed to the Court of Appeal within the previous 585
days. We also introduce the interaction between ‘Presiding Judge Just Arrived’ and ‘Elite’.14
Again, the results run counter to the favoritism interpretation: cases with recently promoted
non-elite presiding judges received fewer citations than cases with recently promoted elite pre-
siding judges. The mean response is economically significant: the coefficient .906 indicates that
an elite status almost doubles the number of citations.
A natural count of citations is a relatively coarse measure of performance, as it treats all
citations equally. Since a citation by the House of Lords is almost certainly a better indicator
of good performance than a citation from a lower court, it would be preferable to construct a
measure where each citation is allocated an endogenously determined weight depending on the
stature of the citing court. In the second column of Table 4 we use such an ‘index of intellectual
influence’ as our dependent variable (with a Tobit rather than OLS specification to account
for the preponderance of zeros). Our index weights each citation by the endogenously deter-
13Anticipating the results in Section 4, we suspect that the small size of the connectivity-at-promotion coeffi-
cient may be due to the fact that these regressions omit judges appointed after 2003 (explaining why the sample
size is 61 rather than 85). With our data ending in 2005 we do not have sufficient Court of Appeal cases to
calculate citation counts for these later promotions.
14To ease the interpretation of interactions we do not consider the effect of connectivity.
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mined influence of the citing court, which is computed using the methodology characterised in
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004).15 Using this measure as our dependent variable leaves our
results (qualitatively) unchanged. Non-elite judges and unconnected judges do not appear to
be more intellectually influential upon promotion.
Of course, at this stage the charge could still be made that strategic citation behaviour
is clouding our results. In the final two columns of Table 4 we report results for our index of
intellectual influence measure disaggregated by the elite status of the citing judge. If citations
are more likely within background groups, then (if it exists) we should finally see evidence
of favoritism in the fourth column where we focus on citations from non-elite judges. Again,
we find no such evidence. Elite judges influence more strongly not only other elite judges but
also non-elite judges. This finding, together with our findings in Table A3 on the allocation of
cases, reinforces our confidence that elite judges are better performers − at least in terms of
this particular dimension of performance − than non-elite judges.
3.5 Discussion
We stress at the outset that we do not (and given our empirical strategy could not) claim to
have resolved conclusively whether senior judges favored candidates with an elite background.
Rather, we limit ourselves to the following more nuanced conclusions. Pooling over our sam-
ple period, elite judges were substantially more likely to be promoted than non-elite judges.
The weight of evidence suggests that this was because elite judges were better endowed with
promotion relevant characteristics than non-elite judges.
Our justification for the latter claim is three-fold. First, we have found direct evidence
consistent with the endowments interpretation: (i) the elite differential more than halves once
we include proxies for official promotion criteria, and (ii) newly promoted elite judges exerted
stronger intellectual influence on both elite and non-elite judges than newly promoted non-elite
judges. Second, we have found direct evidence inconsistent with the favoritism interpretation
(at least in the ‘self-cloning’ form referred to in legal and policy circles): sharing the same
narrowly defined background with members of the promotion committee was associated with
a lower chance of promotion. Third, we failed to find direct evidence consistent with the
favoritism hypothesis: the elite differential is not lower for high stakes vacancies. The only
evidence in favour of the favoritism hypothesis is indirect (at best, especially given our imperfect
proxy for ability): the small residual elite differential could still be due to favoritism.
In view of the small sample size, we have used an empirical strategy that is simple and
hence open to criticism. In particular, one might point to the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives property of the discrete choice model. We use the logit specification because it allows
us to estimate on a subset of alternatives (the full set is greater than N = 85). In our setting,
it seems reasonable that adding another alternative (effectively a ‘slot’ that is not intrinsically
15Details of the variable construction are provided in Appendix B.
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any more or less like any other) would leave the ratio of choice probabilities unaffected and
result in proportionate substitution. Consistent with this, the dramatic reduction in the elite
differential is also present in a survival framework that, by construction, does not impose IIA.16
4 Did Senior Judges Pander in the Face of Reform?
In the previous Section we examined the hypothesis that senior judges showed a ‘lack of dis-
cipline’ by favouring elite candidates for promotion to the Court of Appeal, and found little
evidence in its favour. In fact, if anything we actually found evidence of ‘pandering’, since
personal ties to the promotion committee seem associated with a lower chance of promotion.
This was not the view held by many politicians, lobby groups and press commentators
however. As Appendix C describes in detail, allegations of elitism and calls for an independent
appointments commission were frequent throughout our sample period. Senior judges were
strongly opposed to reform, openly stating their reluctance to cede control over promotions,
and until 2003 managed to kill in the ground all such attempts by both Conservative and Labour
governments. On June 12 2003, however, the Labour Prime Minister unexpectedly announced
that a new body would take responsibility for judicial appointments, including promotions to
the Court of Appeal. As we argue in Appendix C, the specific composition of this new body was
subject to considerable uncertainty for nearly two years, with alternative proposals − in which
judges held very different levels of influence− being considered. Since senior judges actively
lobbied to influence the final composition of the new body, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
any perception of favoritism during this period would have been damaging to their case.
The purpose of this Section is to investigate whether this hypothesized increase in the
returns to minimizing perceptions of favoritism affected promotion decisions in the period after
June 2003. In doing so, we highlight that neither the official criteria for promotion nor the
identity of the Heads of Division forming the committee changed in June 2003. In particular,
the same Heads of Division − a group that we will call the ‘Heads at Announcement’ − had
been in charge since July 2000 and remained in their posts until after the reform passed into
law in March 2005.17
4.1 Unconditional Evidence
We first investigate whether the raw data indicate any change in the behaviour of the promo-
tion committee. The first cells of Panel A in Tables 5a and 5b reveal that 6% of the High
16Results from survival models are reported in earlier versions of this paper, and are available upon request.
17There is one caveat: the identity of the Lord Chancellor did change in June 2003. However, note that it is
the connectivity to the Heads of Division that determines a candidate chances of promotion. Connectivity to
the Lord Chancellor plays no role. This fact, together with the quotes from Section 2, suggests that in practice
the promotion decisions are delegated to the Heads of Division.
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Court judges serving between July 2000 and June 2003 were promoted (by the ‘Heads at An-
nouncement’) during this pre-announcement period. Disaggregating, we find evidence of elite
and connected differentials of 9% and 7% respectively. These differentials are smaller than in
Table 1 and only significant at the 10% level, reflecting in part the shorter time frame. The
second row of Panel A in Tables 5a and 5b repeats the exercise for High Court judges serving
between June 2003 and April 2005. Again, close to 6% of these judges were promoted (by the
‘Heads at Announcement’) during this post-announcement period. Now, however, the elite and
connected are 1% and −4% respectively. Neither differential is statistically different from zero,
although for connectivity status the negative difference in difference estimate is significant at
the 10% level. As such, the raw data provide weak evidence that personal ties to the promotion
committee were less favorable for promotion in the post-announcement period relative to the
earlier period.
These raw statistics fail to adjust for censoring, however. In Panel B of Tables 5a and
5b we provide similar evidence, this time from Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. Our approach
here is motivated by the promotion hazard in Figure 2 which reaches a maximum at seven years
and is close to zero after 10 years of experience.18 With this observation in mind, we compare
the elite (connected) differential in survivor functions for two adjacent cohorts of judges: those
with 8-10 years and 10-12 years experience at June 2003. Our logic stems from Figure 2: the
less-experienced cohort could plausibly have been affected by a change in committee behaviour
whereas the more-experienced cohort could not.
It is hard to think why there should be a difference in the elite (connected) difference in
Kaplan-Meier survivor functions across two adjacent and otherwise similar cohorts, other than
via a change in committee attitude towards elite (connectivity) status. We find that there is
indeed such a difference. In Table 5a the Log Rank test rejects the null of equality of survivor
functions across elite status for the 10-12 years cohort but not for the less-experienced 8-10
years cohort. In Table 5b, consistent with the evidence in Panel A, the sign of the connected
differential in the proportion predicted to be promoted within 12 years is positive for the 10-12
years cohort but negative for the 8-10 years cohort. These findings are consistent with the view
that eligible non-elite judges were passed over for promotion prior to the announcement but
then ‘saved’ in the post-announcement period.
4.2 Discrete Choice Results
We now use the specification outlined in Section 3.3 to examine the conditional evidence for a
change in promotion committee behaviour following the announcement of the reforms.19 We
do so in the obvious fashion, namely by interacting our variables with a dummy ‘Reform’ that
18Precisely the same pattern is true out-of-sample, e.g. for the inflow sample between 1960 and 1980.
19As noted in footnote 12, unfortunately data limitation prevent us from repeating the post-promotion speci-
fication in Section 3.4.
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captures whether a promotion committee makes its decision after June 2003.
The first column of Table 6 contains a single interaction with the elite status variable.
The sign of the coefficient ‘Elite*Reform’ is negative and statistically significant, indicating
a large change in the elite differential following the announcement of the reforms. While the
elite differential is positive during the baseline period, it actually becomes negative during the
post-announcement period.
In the second column we add interactions with our main connectivity variable. The
negative coefficient ‘Connectivity to Heads’ indicates that being strongly connected to the
Heads of Division decreased a candidate’s chances of promotion in the baseline period. The
negative coefficient ‘Connectivity to Heads*Reform’ suggests that it decreased these chances
even more during the post-announcement period. The change in behaviour is economically as
well as statistically significant: an increase in connectivity of one standard deviation decreases
the odds of being promoted from one to .801 = exp(−4.437 ∗ .05) during the baseline period
but to a significantly lower .173 = exp((−30.605− 4.437) ∗ .05) during the post-announcement
period.
In the third column of Table 6 we add interactions with the nature of the vacancy
being filled. The introduction of these triple interactions calls for some care in interpreting the
coefficients. For instance, the coefficient ‘Elite’ should now be interpreted as the elite differential
for Court of Appeal vacancies generated as a result of a retirement during the baseline period.
The statistically insignificant ‘Elite*Promotion Vacancy’ coefficient suggests that, during the
baseline period, the elite differential was not different for different types of vacancies. Similarly,
the sum of the coefficient ‘Elite’ and ‘Elite*Reform’ (i.e. −2.512 = 1.798− 4.310) captures the
elite differential for retirement vacancies during the post-announcement period. The sum of
the four coefficients (i.e. 1.596 = 1.798 − 4.310 − 1.496 + 5.604) captures the elite differential
for promotion vacancies during the post-announcement period. Testing whether the sum of
‘Elite*Promotion Vacancy’ and ‘Elite*Promotion Vacancy*Reform’ is equal to zero is therefore
equivalent to testing whether, during the reform period, the elite differential was different for
different types of vacancies. We reject the null hypothesis of this test at the 10% level (p-
value=.059). This provides weak evidence that, during the post-announcement period, elites
were more likely to be selected to fill promotion vacancies than retirement vacancies.20
4.3 Discussion
There are two separate issues to discuss here: whether non-elites/unconnected judges were
indeed favored and, if so, whether any such finding can really be attributed to pandering and
20An alternative way of interpreting these coefficients is to note that the post-announcement period led to a
decrease in the likelihood of elites filling retirement vacancies (the p-value of the ‘Elite*Reform’ coefficient is
.001) but did not lead to a decrease in the likelihood of elites filling promotion vacancies (testing whether the
sum of ‘Elite*Reform’ and ‘Elite*Promotion Vacancy*Reform’ is zero we obtain a p-value of .532).
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the threat of reform. There is certainly evidence of the former. Controlling for promotion
criteria, the elite differential changed sign from positive to negative in the period after June
2003. In contrast, most of our proxies for promotion-relevant characteristics did not change
during this period. For an omitted quality variable to explain the increase in fortune of the
non-elite, it would therefore have to be orthogonal to the measures suggested by the Judges’
Council.21 Similarly, we see that the connected differential changes from being small and
only weakly significant to strongly negative in the period after June 2003. Arguably, it is
even harder to attribute this change to omitted (non-elite) candidate quality; given our other
controls, variation in connectivity status is essentially driven by committee characteristics.
The issue of attribution is far harder and, ultimately, can only be speculated about.
The most obvious alternative to pandering is that we have observed an unexpected form of
ill-discipline, whereby the promotion committee actually preferred to appoint non-elite can-
didates. We feel this is unlikely. First, we found no suggestion of this possibility among the
political and academic commentators of the period. Second, the same Heads of Division were in
place from July 2000 until April 2005. Historically, this group held the balance of power within
the committees and, as we have argued, previously appeared to have been disciplined or con-
gruent. Interpreting our findings as reflecting the true preferences of the promotion committee
would require claiming that the same Heads of Division somehow changed their preferences
dramatically in June 2003. Third, although the overall composition of the committees did
change, the only prominent new member − a new Lord Chancellor − both played a small role
in the actual decisions and stood to gain little from imposing his preference as his position was
to be abolished as part of the reforms.
We conclude by pointing to one final piece of evidence against the stereotypical claim
that senior judges favored elites. The change in the elite differential was different, depending on
the nature of the vacancy generated in the Court of Appeal. While it decreased for ‘low stake
vacancies’ − those generated by a Court of Appeal judge exiting into retirement or the statutory
creation of a new post − it remained unchanged for ‘high stake vacancies’, generated as a result
of a promotion. Consequently, while the elite differential was statistically similar for both types
of vacancies during the baseline period, it became much higher for promotion vacancies relative
to retirement vacancies during the post-announcement period. This finding that elite judges
were more likely to access ‘high stakes’ vacancies even in the post-announcement period provides
further evidence against the hypothesis of favoritism discussed in Section 3. During the post-
announcement period, promoting non-elite judges arguably became more attractive. However,
this did not appear to have translated into an increase in non-elites accessing ‘high stake
vacancies’. It seems that another force − higher merit or endowment of promotion-relevant
characteristics − was acting as a countervailing force.
21The few proxies that changed did so by making elite judges even better candidates relative to non-elite. The
aforementioned omitted quality variable would therefore have to be negatively correlated with these variables.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has addressed two empirical questions. Did senior judges show a lack of discipline
by favouring elites? And did senior judges pander in the face of reform? Our answers to both
questions are qualified given the limitations of the available data. To the first, we say unlikely.
And to the second, quite possibly.
At a general level, these findings contribute to our understanding of the incentives and
behaviour of public officials. As we noted in the Introduction, a growing theoretical literature
has analysed the decision-making distortions that can arise when informed politicians wish to
signal congruence of preferences with voters. Empirical evidence of such pandering behaviour is
scarce however. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to document it economet-
rically −albeit in tenured public officials, rather than the elected politicians usually considered.
In this sense, our findings also cast doubt on the wisdom of drawing sharp distinctions between
“judges” and “politicians”. Tenure need not imply unaccountability and, in turn, a lack of
discipline or pandering behaviour.
On this point, we note a somewhat forlorn postscript to the English experience of con-
stitutional reform. Barely two years after it was introduced, the work of the new judicial
appointments commission has been criticised. Tellingly, the chair of the Home Affairs Select
Committee recently remarked that, in terms of appointing candidates with a less traditional
background, the new system is “actually worse” than the previous system under higher judicial
influence22. Responding to claims that, despite their reduced influence, judges have still been
managing to favour elite and well-connected candidates, the Government is currently proposing
to hand in even more control to lay commissioners. Our evidence that senior judges were, if
anything, favouring non-elite candidates under the previous system offers an alternative ex-
planation for the ‘poor’ performance of the commission, one that suggests the further reforms
will not be a quick fix. Rather, the data indicate that attention would be better focused on
widening access at the early stages of a legal career.
22Quoted in “The first ten High Court judges under new diversity rule”, The Guardian, January 28 2008
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Appendix
A Tables
See Tables A1- A3.
B Index of Intellectual Influence
We now outline the method used in Section 3.3 to weight each citation by the intellectual
influence of a representative article in the citing court. To construct this measure of intellectual
influence we use the ranking method in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) −henceforth PHV.
We first identify the set of seven courts in our database:
J = (HL,CACiv, CACrim,QBD,CHD,FAM,EAT )
We use the forty thousand cases in our database to construct the primitives of our problem.
We construct a matrix of citations across courts, C = (cij)(ij)∈J×J , where cij captures the total
number of citations of cases in court i by cases in court j during our sample period. From
C we can easily calculate cj =
∑
i∈J cij (the total sum of citations made by cases in court j)
and DC = diag(cj)j∈J (the diagonal matrix with the sums of the courts’ citations as its main
diagonal). Lastly, we construct a vector a ∈ (ai)i∈J (the number of cases in each court) and
A = diag(ai)i∈J .
Using these primitives, our objective is to construct a (normalised) cardinal ranking of
the courts in J , that is, a vector of non-negative valuations (vi)i∈J . We will interpret vj as the
intellectual influence of a representative article in court j. Intuitively, we would like a court j
to receive a higher valuation when it is cited both more often and by more influential courts.
Of course, this creates a simultaneity problem. Following PHV, we derive v as the solution to
the following equation:
CD−1C Av = Av
PHV show that this ranking method is the unique method satisfying the properties of
anonymity, invariance to citation intensity, weak homogeneity, weak consistency, and invari-
ance to splitting of courts. We display the computed valuations in the first column of Table
A4, together with the matrix of citations and the vector of number of cases. Lastly, we use
the computed valuations to weight the citations received by a case. For example, if a case
received two citations from CA Crim cases and one citation from a FAM case, we calculate the
intellectual influence of this case as .23 = 2 ∗ .08 + .07.
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Table A4
Valuation # of Cases Citing Court
Cited Court HL CA Civ CA Crim QBD CHD FAM EAT
HL .64 769 95 556 187 556 230 41 102
CA Civ .11 8928 81 1873 19 1400 807 163 335
CA Crim .08 7606 27 16 2405 85 7 4 1
QBD .03 12977 23 405 70 1615 136 10 16
CHD .04 6128 14 271 6 169 907 8 8
FAM .07 1107 5 95 0 22 5 190 0
EAT .03 1921 4 58 1 8 2 0 410
Total 1 39436 249 3274 2688 3855 2094 416 872
C A Brief History of The Constitutional Reform Act
Consultation in the 1990s. In 1994, in the wake of criticism from, e.g., Justice (a legal re-
form group) and The Law Society, the Lord Chancellor commissioned a Select Committee
enquiry into judicial appointments, including consideration of a judicial appointments com-
mission (JAC). Interim reports indicated that the Committee was split over the need for an
independent JAC, with Labour members broadly in favour and Conservative members against.
Consistent with this, at the 1995 Party Conference Labour publicly declared its support for a
JAC. Significantly, the Judges’ Council was strongly opposed, largely on the grounds that it
would introduce politics into the process. In oral evidence to the Committee, the Lord Chief
Justice (then the senior Head of Division) declared that he could not “imagine anything more
horrific”. The will of the judiciary quickly won out, with the Committee concluding in 1996
that there was no need for a large scale change.
Aborted consultation in 1997. Shortly after the election in May 1997, details of Labour’s
plans for a JAC were leaked to the press. The judiciary again seized the opportunity to voice its
disapproval, with a senior Court of Appeal judge happily going on record to say that “Judges
rightly would be concerned, until they see the White Paper, about the dangers of politicising the
system”.23 Although plans for a consultation exercise were formally announced a month later,
the White Paper itself never emerged. In October 1997, the Lord Chancellor declared that the
consultation had been shelved. This u-turn did not go unnoticed and prompted a sequence
of questions in the House of Commons. In the summer of 1999, in the face of unprecedented
criticism of the appointments system (fuelled by the rise of judicial review under the Human
23“Labour faces row over reforms to end elitism in the courts”, The Times, May 27 1997.
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Rights Act 1998), the Lord Chancellor appointed Sir Leonard Peach to report on the operation
of the appointments procedure. The terms of reference were strictly limited, however. Peach
was to look at how appointments were made, not by whom, effectively ruling out consideration
of a JAC. His report led to the creation of the Commission for Judicial Appointments, a
(confusingly named) oversight body. Criticisms of the system rumbled on, however, heightened
by negative reports by the CJA and the establishment of JACs in Scotland and Northern
Ireland.
Reform Announced in 2003. In June 2003, the Prime Minister “took the legal world
by surprise” (Malleson 2004) by simultaneously announcing that a JAC would be introduced
and the (1,000 year old) office of the Lord Chancellor abolished. This time there was no
prior consultation, with senior judges, the Attorney General and the speaker of the House of
Lords all unaware of the plans. The nature of the announcement prompted comments that
the Government was trying to wrestle power from the judges.24 Although the Government did
not consult on whether to introduce a JAC, it did solicit views on how the commission should
operate. Broadly speaking, the Government was in favour of a recommending commission
that left ultimate responsibility for appointments to a minister (citing the need to safeguard
democratic accountability), while the judiciary was in favour of an appointing commission with
a “promotions panel” consisting primarily of judges for the Court of Appeal and above (citing
the need to safeguard judicial independence, as well as their superior knowledge of candidates).
The passage of the Bill proved to be protracted. In February 2004 the Constitutional Affairs
Committee reported that the Bill should be considered in draft, as the consultation had been
“rushed”. This did not happen but, at its second reading, the Bill was referred to a House of
Lords Select Committee (a highly unusual step not used since the 1920’s) as there had been no
time for “pre-legislative scrutiny”. The Bill, replete with a Concordat, finally received Royal
Ascent in March 2005, nearly two years after its controversial announcement.
24See, for instance, Justice (who had called for a JAC since 1992) voicing their fears in The Times, “ Is this
a ruthless grab for power?” July 1 2003, and an article in The Economist questioning whether the Government
was intent on “nobbling” the judiciary, “Blair’s own goal” July 19 2003.
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